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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 19-3095
_____________

ISAAC W. SANDERS,
Appellant
v.
PENNSYLVANIA’S STATE SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION; EAST
STROUDSBURG UNIVERSITY
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3-18-cv-01423)
District Judge: Hon. A. Richard Caputo
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 30, 2020
______________
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., PORTER, and MATEY, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: April 29, 2020)
______________
OPINION*
______________
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
In this case, we must decide whether Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not
constitute binding precedent.

protects Pennsylvania’s State System of Higher Education and its constituent universities.
For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-Appellant Isaac W. Sanders (“Sanders”) sued Defendants-Appellees
Pennsylvania’s State System of Higher Education (“PASSHE”) and East Stroudsburg
University (collectively, “Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sanders argues that
Defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by engaging in
“stigmatizing conduct” that has destroyed Sanders’s “good name, reputation, honor and
integrity.” JA9. He also alleged various causes of action under state law, including
intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. Sanders filed his first
complaint on July 17, 2018. The following facts are taken from Sanders’s second
amended complaint.
In 2007, Sanders was employed at East Stroudsburg University as the Vice
President for Advancement, head of the Advancement Office, and the Chief Executive
Officer of the East Stroudsburg University Foundation. In August 2007, a student filed a
sexual harassment complaint against Sanders with the University’s Office of Diversity
and Equal Opportunity. Later that fall, the University received five anonymous letters
making various complaints against Sanders, some of which alleged that Sanders was
responsible for “financial misdeeds” and “sexual predatory behavior.” JA24. After an
investigation, the University president decided that there was insufficient evidence to
support the student’s allegations and closed the matter. The University also performed a
forensic audit of the foundation, which found no financial misdeeds. However,
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PASSHE’s counsel sent the anonymous complaints to the FBI.
Additional complaints followed in 2008, some of which were covered in a local
paper. Sanders was then placed on administrative leave while an outside law firm
conducted an investigation. Based on this investigation, “Counsel for PASSHE
concluded that sufficient evidence of sexual harassment existed despite previous
conclusions of the first two investigations conducted by President Dillman, Provost
Borland, and/or their designees.” JA36.
Sanders was terminated on October 22, 2008. According to Sanders, public
comments by members of the PASSHE board, including the Governor of Pennsylvania,
perpetuated a public perception that Sanders was guilty of criminal sexual acts against
students. Sanders alleges that Defendants have not attempted to remedy the reputational
harm that these incidents beset upon him.
Six students filed a civil lawsuit against Sanders and other state defendants in
February 2009. The jury returned its verdict for Sanders in October 2014. This Court
affirmed and denied the plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing en banc in 2017. Defendants
never provided Sanders with defense counsel and did not agree to indemnify him for his
costs, even though the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania represented the other defendants
in the lawsuit.
The Pennsylvania Attorney General issued an apology to the student plaintiffs in
2018. The Attorney General also withdrew its bill of costs against the unsuccessful
plaintiffs.
Sanders initially filed suit against PASSHE, East Stroudsburg University, and
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several individual defendants. The District Court granted the individual defendants’
motion to dismiss on April 17, 2019. Sanders then filed a second amended complaint.
The District Court granted PASSHE and East Stroudsburg University’s motion to dismiss
on August 14, 2019. Sanders timely appealed.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review grants of motions to dismiss de
novo. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014).
“[W]e accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d
Cir. 2006). We may affirm on any basis which finds support in the record, even if the
district court did not reach it. See Kabakjian v. United States, 267 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir.
2001).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that we should affirm the District Court’s dismissal because
Sanders’s claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. We agree.
The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
any one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The purpose of Eleventh Amendment is to
protect “the States’ solvency and dignity.” Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513
U.S. 30, 52 (1994); see also Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir.
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2016) (“[The Eleventh Amendment] has evolved into a potent tool for States to ensure
that States retain their sovereignty and integrity as constituent polities of our national
government.”). To further this goal, the Amendment “has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court to shield States and certain State-affiliated entities from suits for damages
in federal court.” Bradley v. W. Chester Univ. of Penn. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 880
F.3d 643, 654 (3d Cir. 2018). The Amendment protects a state from suit by its own
citizens as well. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100
(1984). There are exceptions to sovereign immunity. A state may consent to suit in
federal court and thereby waive its immunity, or Congress may abrogate states’ immunity
via legislation. See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 694 (3d Cir.
1996).
We perform a “fact-intensive, three-step balancing test” to determine whether a
state institution is protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Maliandi, 845 F.3d at
83. Specifically, we look at: (1) whether the state treasury would pay for an adverse
judgment against the institution; (2) the status of the institution under state law; and (3)
the degree of autonomy from state control that the institution maintains. Id. If a federal
court determines that a state institution is protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity,
the suit against that institution must be dismissed, as the court does not have jurisdiction.
See, e.g., id. at 99 (holding that, unless the district court determined on remand that the
state waived its immunity, the suit must be dismissed); Blanciak, 77 F.3d at 693 n.2
(“[T]he Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of
subject matter jurisdiction.”).
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In Bradley, we performed this three-part test and decided that PASSHE and its
universities are so protected. We therefore affirmed the dismissal of the appellant’s
§ 1983 complaint against PASSHE and one of its universities. Bradley, 880 F.3d at 654.
Sanders has not offered any basis on which to distinguish his case from Bradley. Indeed,
Sanders has not even responded to Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment argument, either
before this Court or before the District Court. We therefore affirm the District Court’s
dismissal of PASSHE and East Stroudsburg University because they are protected by
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.1
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm.

Although Eleventh Amendment immunity is the death knell of Plaintiff’s appeal,
any consideration of the merits is also foreclosed by Sanders’s failure to comply with the
applicable two-year statute of limitations. Contrary to Sanders’s contention, the
continuing violations doctrine does not apply here. Sanders has not alleged that
Defendants committed any affirmative acts in the limitations period. See 287 Corp. Ctr.
Assocs. v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 101 F.3d 320, 324 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that the focus
of the continuing violations doctrine is on whether the defendant committed any
affirmative acts in the limitations period). The two affirmative acts that Sanders alleges
in his complaint (his termination and Defendants’ failure to provide him with defense
counsel in the civil suit) took place in 2008 and 2009 respectively. By his own
admission, Sanders was aware of these acts when they occurred. See Montanez v. Sec’y
Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., 773 F.3d 472, 481 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[T]he continuing violation
doctrine does not apply when the plaintiff is aware of the injury at the time it occurred.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Sanders’s allegations within the limitations period
are no more than “continual ill effects” from Defendants’ original affirmative acts. Id.
Further, the District Court did not err in dismissing Sanders’s complaint at the
Rule 12(b)(6) stage, as it was “apparent on the face of [Sanders’s] complaint” that he
failed to bring his claim within the statute of limitations. See Fried v. JP Morgan Chase
& Co., 850 F.3d 590, 604 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249
(3d Cir. 2014)).
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